A. INTRODUCTION
connection between the contemporary crime of violation of sepulchres and the Roman crimen violati sepulcri. 24 The article expounds the reason for the Roman law's treatment of interred cadavers as res divini iuris -things consigned to divine law -and posits that, notwithstanding the fact that post-Reformation Scots law was generally reluctant to recognise the existence of consecrated or 'sacred' grave-sites, 25 the concept of res religiosae was nevertheless received into Scotland by dint of the evolution of the crimen violati sepulcri. If this is indeed the case, then it follows that a lawfully exhumed cadaver may, again, become the subject of theft, since the constitutive elements of any res religiosa return to their profane state in circumstances in which the body is separated from the grave-site.
26 22 Gordon, Criminal Law, Vol. II (4 th Edition), para.21.26 23 The burial need not necessary be a religious one in order to realise the creation of a res religiosa. As discussed infra, every citizen has the potential to create a res religiosa under certain conditions and there is no need for religious official to set the creation of the res religiosa in motion. Thus, in spite of the religious overtone of the term 'res religiosae', it is submitted that wholly secular (or, indeed, Humanist) funerals in which a body is interred with sufficient solemnity effects the creation of a res religiosa, for those reasons which are expounded during the course of this article. 24 See HM Advocate v Samuel (1742) MacLaurin Criminal Cases Reports 662, wherein the charge libelled was one of crimen violati sepulcri, and HM Advocate v Coutts (1899) 3 Adam 50 wherein the phrase crimen violati sepulcri was used as a keyword. 25 27 -all the law that we make use of has reference either to persons or to things or to actions. This tripartite division of law proved extremely influential; the later ius commune jurists and Scottish institutional writers employed and expanded upon it, 28 ultimately developing the division of private law into four categories of persons, property, actions and obligations. 29 This four-way division retains relevance in modern mixed and
Civilian legal systems in the present day.
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As might be inferred from the evolution of the original tripartite division into a quadripartite division, and from the nature of that later division itself, the Roman ius quod ad res pertinet encompassed not only what would now be termed the law of 'property', 31 but
extended to cover what would now be understood as the law of 'obligations' as well. 32 The
Latin word 'res' itself must consequently be understood as meaning 'thing' 33 (or, indeed, 'things', as res is both the nominative singular and the nominative plural) in preference to 'property' in translation, in spite of some claims that the word 'thing' is too 'undignified' a The principles of accessio may, therefore, provide appropriate guidance as to how, precisely, a res religiosa could be said to be created by the act of burying a cadaver. Accessio was a mode of original acquisition whereby an object -the accessory -accedes to a larger object -the principal -and so becomes part of that larger object. 73 There were a number of ways in which accessio could be effected, 74 most relevant to the present discussion is the process of inaedificatio. 75 The quintessential example of accessio by way of inaedificatio is the fixture of some moveable property to an immoveable piece of land or a building. 76 As a result of the maxim omne quod inaedificatio solo cedit -all that is built on soil accedes to the soil -any res mobilis which is affixed to land becomes the property of the owner of the res immobilis, 77 even if the owner of the res immobilis had no connection to the party who built on their land. 78 As the creation of a res religiosa necessarily involved the placing of a res mobilis into res immobilis, and as the locus religiosus was, when combined with the interred body, the res religiosa itself, it might be inferred that the burial of a corpse stands as an example of accessio by way of inaedificatio as the corpse, in being interred, accedes to the land in which it is buried.
With the principal and the accessory thus combined, the res religiosae is thus created and consequently, in spite of the principle that the owner of the solum becomes owner of the The need for the land to be owned by the burier, or for the burial to take place only with the consent of the landowner, in order to create a validly constituted res religiosa is thus explained.
The principles of inaedificatio explain how the character of the corpse and grave-site are changed when they are combine; the consistent requirement for the consent of the landowner to the interment allows for the alienation of the object from the general laws of property. 
C. SCOTS LAW (1) Scots Law and the Crimen Violati Sepulcri
It is clear that the modern Scottish crime of violation of sepulchres is fundamentally Roman in origin. In those cases which directly concerned charges of the crime, the courts referred directly to the charge as being one of crimen violati sepulcri 97 and those commentators who first deigned to comment on its operation in Scots law described it as such in their textbooks. Duncan and Johnston refers to this as but a 'quasi-religious character'). 109 The second principle is concerned with ensuring that the benefit of the churchyard, in respect of the community that the parish is intended to serve, is secured.
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On a Romanistic analysis, these two distinct principles would appear to indicate that the character of a grave-site, as a sepulchre, is protected as a hybrid of a res sacrae, res religiosae and a res sanctae. 111 Res sacrae received their special character -their status as things excluded from the law of private property -by dint of their having been consecrated by a priest; 112 indeed, the res sacrae itself was created by the occurrence of such consecration. 113 As emphasised in the previous section, res religiosae could be created by anyone -there was no need for the creator of a res religiosae to possess any religious character, any legal persona could create such an object by interring a corpse in land that they owned. 114 Res sanctae were those objects that held such significance to the community that interference with them was 'sanctioned' by capital punishment.
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It is apparent that the burial of a corpse in a churchyard may be said to invoke the characteristics of all three types of those things consigned to the divini iuris. 149 It is necessary, for the process of accession to occur in Scots law, for the moveable to be physically attached to the heritage 150 and for the moveable to be functionally subordinate to the land. 151 As a corpse is placed in a grave in order to fulfil the purpose of the grave-site, the accessory may be said to be subordinate to the heritage; as the body is physically placed within the land, there is evidently sufficient attachment to effect accession. 152 It is consequently submitted that a corpse accedes to the land in which it is buried in Scots law, just as it did so under the Roman law. This accession leads to the creation of an object akin to a Romanistic res religiosa, even if the authorities concerned with the Scottish crime of violation of sepulchres do not make use of this term. Scots law does not require that the annexor or the landowner intended for the accession to be permanent in determining whether or not inaedificatio occurred, 153 although in (almost) 154 all circumstances in which the union is permanent in fact, accession can be said to have operated. 155 In instances involving separable properties which have ostensibly acceded, as in South Africa, 156 in modern Scots law, the question of whether or not inaedificatio has occurred depends greatly on the circumstances of each particular case. 157 In general, inaedificatio is thought to occur in situations in which the fixture which accedes to the land could be said to have appeared to do so by onlookers. 158 As it is presumed that all citizens are aware of their obligations under the violation of sepulchres, it may be inferred that the interment of the body would be regarded as a fixture by any reasonable onlooker.
The fact that the cadaver can be physically separated from the grave-site does not, therefore, negate the possibility of its having acceded to the grave for as long as it is interred.
It is apparent that the burial of a corpse in a grave-site is intended to be a permanent arrangement. As the presence of the body in the land is necessary for the continued existence of any res religiosa, it can be inferred that the authorised removal of a cadaver caused that body to return to its previously profane state -by which, it is meant, the body may once again be the subject of theft, being that the crime of violation of sepulchres will not extend protection to bodies which are not buried in sepulchres.
This analysis is relevant as 'there is no authority dealing specifically with exhumed remains'
159 and so it is not clear, in law, whether or not the appropriation of an exhumed cadaver ought to be subject to the law of theft or if the rules relating to the crime of violation of sepulchres irredeemably changed the character of the corpse on its interment. As noted in the introduction, Leverick and Chalmers suggested two possible legal outcomes arising out of the appropriation of an exhumed cadaver. 160 They posit that the reason that the buried body is afforded protection, in law, by the crime of violation of sepulchres is that it has either, by burial, been abandoned, or it has simply become incapable of being owned altogether. 161 If the former is to be regarded as the case, then the exhumed cadaver may, once it is no longer subject to protection by the crime of violation of sepulchres, once again be stolen; if the latter is to be regarded as the case then the human body, once buried, is removed from the ambit of property law altogether on burial and so can never again be stolen.
(2) The Appropriation of Exhumed Cadavers
The attempts made by Leverick and Chalmers to explain the reason that the body, once interred, cannot be stolen are neither ethically, legally nor logically satisfactory. If the cadaver is abandoned on burial, it would become the property of the Crown on burial and so be capable of being the subject of theft even while buried.
The second of the two suggestions is unsatisfactory on a number of grounds and Leverick and Chalmers plainly posit that their proposition is 'not free from difficulties'. 171 If an exhumed cadaver is no longer capable of being owned, then it logically cannot be stolen and so all of the problems faced by English law by dint of its 'no property' rule 172 would plague Scotland in respect of exhumed cadavers. In order to prosecute those who appropriate exhumed cadavers in such circumstances, the Scottish courts would be forced, like their English brethren, to make use of 'creative judicial reasoning' 173 which is anathema to the principle of legal certainty and the equitable operation of justice. 174 Some additional problems with this proposition are raised when one considers the fact that, again, in any instance in which a body is lawfully exhumed, there will necessarily be persons who enjoy possessory rights to the cadaver. 175 The existence of such possessory rights may, again, serve to allow for the presumption that the possessor is to be recognised as the 'owner', per Scots law. Even in the absence of this presumption, it would appear illogical to suggest that the body cannot be stolen, being that dispossession of those who hold the exhumation warrant would necessarily amount to spuilzie. 176 The submission that interred cadavers are protected by the crime of violation of sepulchres due to an implicit recognition of the grave-site as a res religiosa circumvents these issues. The difficulty with the abandonment thesis is avoided since there is a justification as to why the body cannot be 'stolen' while it is interred and there is likewise no need to suggest that a reverential funeral may be equated with the simple abandonment of a piece of property.
The problems with holding that a body, once buried, is simply and inexplicably removed from the ambit of 'property law' are likewise averted. If the grave-site is a res religiosa, but the constituent parts of the res religiosa are profane and so subject to the laws of property, then it follows that, notwithstanding the fact that the body and grave-site cease to be governed by the ordinary laws of property while a cadaver is interred within, the law must necessarily recognise that exhumed cadavers can be stolen as the removal of a body from a res religiosa means that the locus religiosus ceases to be a res religiosa. Both corpse and grave, in such circumstances, are once again regulated by the ordinary rules of property.
Prior to burial, certain relevant persons are granted the right to possess the corpse to ensure its burial. 177 As cadavers can be stolen before the burial occurs, it may be presumed that the possessor is, until the time of burial, the owner of the body. 178 Once the body is buried, there is no enduring right of possession, although there may be persons with ius sepulcri in respect of the grave. 179 Such ius sepulcri does not, however, imply either ownership or legal possession; merely the ability to authorise decisions in respect of the grave-site. If a body is lawfully exhumed, then, once again, certain relevant persons will be granted the right to possess the body to ensure its re-burial or cremation elsewhere. Once again, it may be presumed that such persons are the 'owners' of the corpse for the purposes of criminal law and thus for the purposes of the law of theft. On this analysis, exhumed cadavers -and those dead bodies which are stored in locales other than grave-sites -can be 'stolen', in law as well as in fact, but there exists a justification as to why they cannot be stolen during their interment.
D. CONCLUSION
From the above, it is apparent that the crime of violation of sepulchres -as derived from the Roman crimen violati sepulcri -implies the existence of res religiosae within Scots law. The crimen violati sepulcri existed, in Roman law, to protect the integrity of grave-sites. In that legal system, all grave-sites were regarded as res religiosae and so were not subject to the ordinary rules of the ius quod ad res pertinet. Such things were consigned to the divini iuris, rather than the humani iuris. While a body was buried, it was not possible to raise a private action for theft if it were stolen, however the crimen violati sepulcri -as an actio popularisallowed any private citizen to accuse an individual who purportedly interfered with a res religiosa. Individuals may have enjoyed ius sepulcri over the grave-site, but this did not grant dominium or imply ius disponendi; rather, it simply allowed the holder of the ius to lawfully exhume the bodies contained in the graves, or to raise a specific actio violati sepulcri in the event of unauthorised interference or removal. English law, wherein a general 'no property' rule operates -yet on burial even a very minor interference with the interred cadaver will incur criminal sanction.
Just as the creation of res religiosae could be explained by the operation of accessiospecifically inaedificatio -in Roman law, so too can the creation of a comparable Scottish res religiosa be explained by the operation of accession in Scots law. The pertinent Roman rules relating to accessio were received into Scots law during the institutional period and, though there are some differences between the Scottish understanding of the doctrine and the Roman law, under both systems it is evident that the moveable cadaver accedes as a fixture to the immoveable grave-site. The removal of the body, in both systems, destroys the res religiosa;
in such circumstances, the constituent elements of the res religiosa return to their previous state, meaning that they are subject to the caprices of the ordinary law of property once more.
This analysis provides a satisfactory explanation as to why a dead body can be the subject of theft prior to burial, but cannot be stolen once it has been buried in Scots law. The analysis is, it is submitted, to be preferred to the other possibilities which have been put forward by other legal commentators. The suggestion that burying a dead body is akin to abandonment is unsatisfactory on both moral and legal grounds; on moral grounds, since most people would likely be unhappy with the suggestion that they abandoned their relatives in burying them, on legal grounds as the law relating to abandonment does not explain why the corpse cannot be stolen while it is interred. Similarly, to hold that a dead body simply ceases to be an object of 'property' altogether on burial is not rationally satisfactory, since that would give rise to the same problems faced by English law as a result of its operative 'no property' rule. As indicated, the 'no property' rule undermines legal certainty and allows for the commission of 'peculiarly indecent' 180 thefts to go unpunished on grounds of a simple legal technicality.
In addition, it is submitted that the alternative explanation of the law surrounding res religiosae functionally explains the absence of 'property' in buried bodies, thus providing a logical basis for the proposition that an unburied body may be stolen, but a buried body may not. On this basis alone, it may be concluded that the analysis provided in this article is to be preferred to the suggestions of abandonment or a complete lack of 'property' after the discharge of burial duties; when this fact is combined with a recognition of the problems presented by the alternative analyses, the suggestion that the logic of the crime of violation of sepulchres can be explained by reference to its Roman law progenitor garners greater currency still.
With that said, the suggestion that Scots law yet recognises res religiosae is not likely to be uncontroversial. The overtly religious overtones of the term and its history may be thought of as incongruent in an increasingly secular -and increasingly irreligious -society.
Nevertheless, however unpalatable the acceptance of a phrase like 'res religiosae' may be to secularists, without an understanding of the history of that term, and the connection that this history enjoys with respect to the operation of contemporary law, the law cannot move forward.
Instances of violation of sepulchres -and instances concerning the unlawful appropriation of cadavers -may be (thankfully) rare, but that is no justification for the neglect of the theoretical
